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Abstract
The past decades have seen a dramatic increase in the number of regulatory agencies (RAs) across 
countries and policy domains. To establish credible regulatory regimes, many RAs are formally 
shielded from direct political influence and thus enjoy high levels of legal autonomy. While grant-
ing formal independence to an agency may erect some institutional barriers to politicization, it 
also generates a strong incentive to appoint ideologically likeminded individuals to the agency 
leadership. An analysis of about 700 top-level appointments to over 100 RAs in 16 West European 
countries between 1996 and 2013 shows that individuals with ties to a government party are much 
more likely to be appointed as formal agency independence increases. Higher levels of legal inde-
pendence are thus associated with greater party politicization—a finding that casts doubt on the 
effectiveness of formal independence as a tool to reduce political influence in RAs.
Introduction
One of the most significant transformations that the 
public sector in European democracies and elsewhere 
has undergone during the past decades is the out-
sourcing of regulatory tasks from the core bureau-
cracy to agencies that often operate at arm’s length 
from elected politicians (Majone 1994). While there 
are multiple causes for this development, one of the 
most prevalent theoretical explanations is the need 
to establish credible policy regimes through limiting 
political interference in regulatory matters (Gilardi 
2002; Majone 1996, 1997). To that end, many 
regulatory agencies (RAs) enjoy high levels of formal 
independence.1
While the theoretical logic behind this argument is 
obvious, it is less clear that de jure independence also leads 
to a greater degree of de facto independence (Hanretty 
and Koop 2012b; Maggetti 2007). As a contribution to 
this debate, this paper presents the first large-N study of 
the relationship between formal independence and the 
party politicization of top-level appointments to RAs.
The theoretical section first sketches the credibility 
argument and how it relates to agency independence 
more broadly. It then argues that, while higher levels 
of formal independence may make it more difficult or 
more costly for elected officials to politicize agencies, 
reducing the government’s formal control over regula-
tory policy may also prompt politicians to respond by 
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1 The terms “formal”, “legal” and “de jure” independence are used 
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primarily appointing affiliates of governing parties, in 
order to exert influence through informal means.
The empirical section examines the relation-
ship between the politicization of top-level appoint-
ments and agencies’ legal independence with data on 
about 700 appointees from over 100 RAs in 16 West 
European democracies between 1996 and 2013. The 
findings show that party politicization increases mark-
edly with legal independence. The credibility gains from 
creating agencies with high formal autonomy may thus 
be partly offset by the higher levels of party politiciza-
tion that such institutional independence engenders.
Theoretical Framework
The Credibility Argument
Over the past decades, the agency model has become the 
standard institutional choice in Europe (and beyond) 
to deal with regulatory matters in a variety of policy 
areas (Christensen and Lægreid 2006; Levi-Faur 2005; 
Majone 1994; Thatcher 2002; Thatcher and Stone Sweet 
2002). Today, RAs are ubiquitous across policy areas as 
diverse as utilities, environmental and consumer protec-
tion, competition, or financial markets. Their spread has 
happened in countries around the globe (Jordana, Levi-
Faur, and Fernández-i-Marín 2011).
One of the most prevalent theoretical explanations 
for the rise of RAs is the need for credible commit-
ment as a tool in policy making (Gilardi 2002; Majone 
1996, 1997, 2002). The credibility argument starts 
from the proposition that governments often find it 
difficult to credibly commit to a specific policy course 
of action in the future (Kydland and Prescott 1977). 
This is because governments usually have the discre-
tion to deviate from earlier stated plans and introduce 
new policies, if they so wish. The anticipation (justi-
fied or not) that a government will stray from its previ-
ously stated policy course leads other actors to adapt 
their behavior not to what the government originally 
announced as its plans but to whatever they expect 
the future policy regime to be. This change in behav-
ior may then in itself be incentive enough to sway the 
government away from its original plans, turning the 
whole exercise into a self-fulfilling prophecy. The dis-
cretion that governments have over policy thus makes 
it difficult for them to credibly bind themselves for the 
future. As a result, the expectation that governments 
have time-inconsistent preferences severely compro-
mises their capacity for effective policy making.
As Shepsle (1991) argues, commitments can be either 
motivationally or imperatively credible. Motivational 
credibility implies that the government’s announced 
plans are believed by other actors to be in line with 
what its preferences are going to be at a later stage. If 
there are no reasons to believe that the government’s 
preferences may be time inconsistent, the commitment 
is “incentive-compatible and hence self-enforcing” 
(Shepsle 1991, 247).
If motivational credibility cannot be achieved, it is 
possible to make a commitment imperatively credible 
by limiting the government’s discretion to deviate from 
the originally stated policy. The most prominent institu-
tional mechanism is to delegate the implementation to 
an agent who is not bound directly by the instructions 
of the government (Epstein and O’Halloran 1999).
This is the theoretical argument that underpins the 
rise in central bank independence. Governments can 
credibly commit to a non-expansionary monetary pol-
icy by delegating authority to an independent central 
bank that emphasizes price stability over economic 
output (Rogoff 1985). Empirically, inflation indeed 
tends to be lower on average in countries with higher 
levels of central bank independence, although the effect 
is sensitive to the choice of countries and time period 
(Berger, de Haan, and Eijffinger 2001; Cukierman 
1992; Klomp and de Haan 2010).
The very same argument has been applied to the 
realm of regulatory politics more generally (Majone 
1997). In areas where governments cannot rely on 
coercion to produce desired policy outcomes (e.g., 
when trying to attract foreign investors or encourag-
ing competition in newly liberalized markets), credible 
commitment becomes an essential tool for effective 
policy making (Gilardi 2002, 2008). These credibility 
pressures require that elected politicians cede some of 
their discretion to bureaucratic agents with high lev-
els of formal independence. The role envisaged for 
these agents is to ensure that a specific policy course of 
action will be followed, even if the government’s pref-
erences change over time.
A prime example is when processes of liberalization 
and privatization create new market opportunities, 
but potential competitors face uncertainty about the 
government’s relationship with former state monopo-
lists (e.g., in the energy, telecommunications, or trans-
port sector) or the extent to which a level playing field 
will be guaranteed through the regulation of natural 
monopolies. However, outsourcing tasks to non-
majoritarian and specialized agencies may also help to 
restore consumer confidence and credibility among the 
wider public after crises or scandals (e.g., in areas such 
as food safety, pharmacovigilance, environmental pro-
tection, or financial markets), when governments are 
vulnerable to accusations of negligence or even com-
plicity with the perpetrators.
Formal Agency Independence as a 
Commitment Device
The most common mechanism to award bureaucrats 
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required to establish credibility is to create RAs with 
high levels of independence (Gilardi and Maggetti 
2011). Independence comes in two forms, de jure (i.e., 
legal or formal) and de facto (i.e., actual). Whereas de 
facto independence refers to “the self-determination of 
agencies’ preferences, and their autonomy throughout 
the use of regulatory competencies” (Maggetti 2007, 
272), formal or legal independence means that agen-
cies are in some form institutionally placed outside the 
bureaucratic chain of command and thus not bound to 
follow directives from the government. This requires 
a weakening of the chain of delegation that typically 
links voters to elected officials, and elected officials 
to the bureaucracy (Müller 2000)— a fact that has 
not been lost on scholars who anticipate a waning of 
democratic accountability as a result of this process 
(Christensen and Lægreid 2007; Maggetti 2010; Mair 
2008, 228; Majone 2001). To be sure, especially in par-
liamentary systems, the governing majority can at any 
time alter the status of an agency by passing legislation 
(Moe and Caldwell 1994). In that sense, no agency can 
ever be fully independent from the political sphere. Yet, 
formal independence still creates obstacles that make it 
more difficult to interfere in the day-to-day operation 
of an agency.
Empirically, legal independence has been measured 
by examining laws and agency statutes with the goal of 
aggregating information on the rules for appointments 
and dismissal of senior agency officials, accountability 
requirements, autonomy over budget and staff, and the 
extent to which an agency shares its regulatory powers 
with other bodies. Quantitative measures on a larger 
scale have been assembled by Gilardi (2002, 2008), 
Hanretty and Koop (2012a), and Bianculli, Fernández-
i-Marín, and Jordana (2013).
Equipped with these (and other) data, research on 
agency independence has found good empirical support 
for the credibility rationale. Most importantly, it has 
been demonstrated that levels of formal agency inde-
pendence are higher in those areas where the need for 
credible policy arrangements is especially pronounced, 
for instance, in utilities regulation (Gilardi 2008, 
59)  or economic regulation more generally (Wonka 
and Rittberger 2010, 744). Also, formal agency inde-
pendence tends to be higher in political systems with 
a smaller number of veto players (Gilardi 2002, 882). 
This result chimes with the idea that credibility deficits 
are larger in countries where the potential for sweep-
ing changes in the government’s preferences (and thus 
greater time inconsistency) is higher.
Even though the theoretical logic and empirical evi-
dence for the credibility thesis are solid, it is important 
to note that there are other potential determinants of 
legal agency independence. As is true for all bureau-
cratic entities, RAs are created through the political 
process and political considerations hence play a deci-
sive role (Moe 1990). Higher levels of political uncer-
tainty, for instance, may create incentives for politicians 
to insulate policies by delegating them to formally 
independent agencies (Gilardi 2005, 2008; Wonka and 
Rittberger 2010). Also, some administrative traditions 
have embraced the concept of formal agency independ-
ence much more enthusiastically than others (Bianculli, 
Fernández-i-Marín, and Jordana 2013).
Linking Formal Independence and Politicization
Whereas much of the empirical evidence is consistent 
with the credibility argument, it is less clear whether 
such de jure independence also leads to de facto inde-
pendence. In an in-depth study of 16 RAs, Maggetti 
(2007) finds that the link between formal and actual 
independence is rather indirect. Formal independence 
is neither a necessary condition for de facto independ-
ence, nor is it in itself sufficient.
Working with a very different empirical approach, 
Hanretty and Koop (2012b) show that the executive 
turnover and agency heads’ vulnerability to govern-
ment change is lower in agencies with high levels of 
legal independence. Furthermore, it has been dem-
onstrated that higher levels of de jure independence 
protect agency executives with political connections 
to parties of the opposition, whereas such party ties 
are likely to reduce the chances of survival in office 
for executives in low-independence agencies (Ennser-
Jedenastik 2015).
In a related study, Thatcher (2005) has shown that 
a number of RAs in four large European economies 
have not been subject to large-scale politicization 
attempts—although the analysis does not examine spe-
cifically whether this result can be attributed to legal 
independence as an explanatory factor.
These studies notwithstanding, we still do not 
know a great deal about the link between formal 
independence and the politicization of RAs, especially 
the party politicization of high-level appointments in 
RAs. The purpose of this paper is to provide one of 
the first systematic empirical examinations of this 
relationship.
Politicization is a very broad term, covering a wide 
range of practices at the politics-bureaucracy nexus 
(Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman 1981; Peters and 
Pierre 2004, 2). As Rouban (2003) outlines, it is most 
typically understood as the appointment, retention, 
promotion, or dismissal (if possible) of bureaucrats 
based on political criteria rather than merit. Yet it is 
important to stress that, in theory if not always in 
practice, politicization is perfectly compatible with the 
rule of law and a highly professional civil service. For 
the purpose of this paper, politicization is treated as a 
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the expense of bureaucratic competence (although such 
worries are sometimes warranted, see Lewis 2007).
The analysis below focuses on the more specific 
phenomenon of party politicization, which explic-
itly refers to the criterion of partisanship in shaping 
civil service careers (as opposed to the milder forms 
of “open” and “bounded” politicization, see Meyer-
Sahling 2008). Party politicization is usually associ-
ated with the promotion of co-partisans to public 
sector positions by government politicians (or, by 
the same logic, the removal of people with ties to the 
“wrong” party). While bureaucratic appointments of 
opposition-affiliated personnel are not uncommon in 
consensus-oriented political systems (Dahlström and 
Niklasson 2013, 899; Schröter 2004, 70; van Thiel 
2012), the more relevant phenomenon for the credibil-
ity of an independent agency is whether the government 
complies with the independence imperative or uses the 
appointment of co-partisans as an informal device in 
order to undermine the agency’s formal autonomy. 
Empirically, the question thus becomes whether party 
politicization increases or decreases with higher levels 
of legal agency independence.
On the one hand formal independence could 
be expected to reduce politicization by institution-
ally isolating agencies from the direct interference of 
government politicians. By this logic, we should see 
less politicization in agencies with high degrees of 
legal independence, and the appointment of co-par-
tisans should be a less common occurrence in highly 
independent RAs.
There are essentially two mechanisms through 
which this result could come about. One is that the 
institutional barriers erected to isolate agencies from 
political influence make the appointment of partisans 
more difficult in practice. For instance, if appointment 
powers are removed from the hands of individual min-
isters, distributed between a number of actors or put 
in the hand of parliament or even involve nonpoliti-
cal institutions (e.g., the respective agency itself), this 
may lower the chances of government loyalists being 
selected for high-level positions.
The other mechanism is more indirect. The level 
of formal independence may act as a signal about 
the extent to which political interference is legiti-
mate. When legal independence is high, politicians 
may arrive at the calculation that its benefits (higher 
credibility but also the potential for blame avoidance) 
exceed the costs of reduced influence on regulatory 
matters. Seeking not to jeopardize these benefits by 
undermining the credibility of formally independent 
RAs, the appointing actors may refrain from nominat-
ing individuals with political ties to the government. 
This argument has been put forward by Thatcher 
(2005, 366–368) as a possible explanation for why 
RAs in his analysis have not experienced large-scale 
interference by political decision makers. For example, 
given that many governments have raised significant 
revenues from privatization and liberalization efforts 
in utility markets, allowing not only for de jure but 
also for de facto independence of energy, railway, and 
telecom regulators may be a price well worth paying.
On the other hand, it could be argued that higher 
levels of de jure independence generate incentives for 
elected officials to politicize agencies with appointees 
loyal to the government. The underlying rationale is 
that politicians will try to compensate their loss of 
formal powers over regulatory matters by using infor-
mal channels of influence—such as the appointment 
of political allies. This idea is basically a reversed ver-
sion of the ally principle, a well-established theoretical 
concept within the principal-agent approach to del-
egation (Bendor, Glazer, and Hammond 2001; Huber 
and Shipan 2002, 2006; Huber, Shipan, and Pfahler 
2001). The ally principle holds that, ceteris paribus, a 
principal is more likely to grant a high level of discre-
tion to an agent if the two have similar preferences. 
The smaller the policy distance between principal and 
agent, the less likely it is that the latter will use his or 
her discretion to the detriment of the former.
Reversing this argument, it can be conjectured that 
greater levels of agency autonomy will incentivize poli-
ticians to appoint likeminded individuals to the head 
of an agency. The ideological or partisan link between 
politician and appointee then (partly) replaces the 
diluted chain of command between the elected official 
and the agency bureaucrat.2
Of course, attempts at overtly politicizing agencies 
through the appointment of co-partisans may jeop-
ardize any credibility gains accrued from legal inde-
pendence. Politicians seeking to reclaim control over 
formally independent institutions through informal 
means thus walk a fine line. However, it is not diffi-
cult to imagine a scenario where the optimal trade-
off between credibility and control is perceived to be 
a combination of high formal independence and high 
informal control through political appointments.
This argument resonates with a branch of the lit-
erature on new public management (NPM). The 
managerialist impetus of NPM-type reforms usually 
promotes the removal of control mechanisms from 
the politician’s toolkit in order to “let the managers 
manage” (Kettl 1997). Yet, elected officials are often 
still held accountable for the quality of public service 
delivery, even though they may have little direct influ-
ence over the institutions that are tasked with policy 
2 To be sure, politicians may even prefer to appoint individuals with more 
extreme preferences to offset the influence of outside actors (e.g., 
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implementation. This discrepancy between formal 
powers and (perceived) accountability creates strong 
incentives to exert some degree of control through 
politicization (Lewis 2008, 3–4; Niklasson 2013; Peters 
and Pierre 2004, 7; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011, 181).
Politicization could, of course, also be driven by 
correlates of formal independence not related to the 
quest for policy control. In administrative systems with 
central bureaucracies that are (relatively) more difficult 
for politicians to penetrate, agencies may provide a val-
uable alternative resource for partisan appointments. 
Also, independent agencies may be less visible or sali-
ent to the public than the central bureaucracy, thus 
awarding politicians more opportunities for patronage 
without consequences. Yet it should be noted that some 
highly independent agencies also draw a great deal of 
media attention and public scrutiny (Maggetti 2012).
Moreover, recent research on the extent and pur-
pose of politicization and patronage in state institu-
tions indicates that the control motivation has become 
central. In a comparative study of 15 European democ-
racies, Kopecký, Mair, and Spirova (2012) find that 
the principal reason to employ party patronage is no 
longer to reward loyalty among party supporters but 
to exercise control over an increasingly fragmented 
and decentralized public sector. Politicization is thus 
an organizational adaptation by parties faced with a 
state apparatus that can no longer be steered effec-
tively with a top-down approach.
Empirical Strategy and Data Overview
In order to explore the relationship between legal agency 
independence and politicization empirically, the analy-
sis draws on an original dataset that combines exist-
ing measures of formal independence with information 
on the partisan background of over 700 high-level 
bureaucrats appointed to over 100 RAs in 16 Western 
European countries3 between 1996 and 2013. Since the 
main explanatory variable in the analysis is legal inde-
pendence, the starting point for the data collection was 
the set of agencies covered in Gilardi’s (2008) study—
the most comprehensive publicly available set of quan-
titative indicators of formal independence. The core 
variable is a composite index of independence that can 
be broken down into five equally weighted component 
indices (referring to the status of agency heads and the 
management board, the relationship with government 
and parliament, autonomy over budget and staff, and 
regulatory powers). For the purpose of this paper, the 
two indices on the status of agency heads and board 
members are used. Agencies are considered more inde-
pendent when their top-level appointees have longer 
and nonrenewable terms, when they are appointed by 
the legislature or actors within the agency rather than 
directly by individual ministers or governments, when 
it is more difficult to remove them, when they cannot 
hold political office simultaneously, and when inde-
pendence is a formal requirement for the appointment. 
Details about the calculation of the index are presented 
in the Supplementary Appendix.
While Hanretty and Koop (2012a) have provided an 
empirical critique of these data, their improved meas-
ure of independence correlates highly with Gilardi’s 
data (r = 0.83). Another reason to use Gilardi’s data 
is that they are relatively easy to supplement in cases 
where agencies were created after the original data 
had been collected. This was done for a handful of 
cases through the coding of regulatory legislation and 
agency statutes.
Gilardi’s data cover RAs in seven regulatory 
domains: competition, financial markets, telecom-
munication, energy, food safety, medicines, and the 
environment. Through extensive archival research in 
over 1,100 annual reports, hundreds of press releases, 
government documents, and websites, 786 high-level 
bureaucrats appointed between 1996 and 2013 were 
identified. These individuals cover (1) the chief execu-
tives, (2) deputy chief executives, and (3) board mem-
bers for agencies steered by a commission or committee 
(often with a quasi-judicial character).
Another round of research in government and 
agency documents, biographical databases, profes-
sional networking websites (e.g., www.linkedin.com), 
media archives, and other online resources was then 
conducted to obtain biographical information on these 
individuals. This information collection was used to 
determine whether individuals have ties to a particular 
political party (similar operationalizations of politici-
zation can be found in Dahlström and Niklasson 2013; 
Ennser-Jedenastik 2014a, 2014b, 2014c; Lewis 2007, 
2008; Niklasson 2013). As discussed above, affiliation 
with a government party serves as an indicator for 
politicization and was coded according to the follow-
ing criteria: (1) having held public or party office (e.g., 
minister, member of parliament, party leader), (2) hav-
ing stood as a party candidate in elections, (3) having 
worked as aide to party politicians (e.g., in a cabinet 
ministeriél or as an aide to parliamentary party group), 
(4) being a party member, (5) being portrayed in media 
accounts as “close to a party.” While the latter criterion 
is less objective, it applies only to a handful of cases. 
Recoding these cases to the reference category has no 
impact on the results reported below.
To be sure, it is possible—even likely—that not 
all instances of party affiliation can be observed, 
3 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, 
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because such information is not always in the public 
domain. However, the figures presented below corre-
spond closely to conventional expectations and earlier 
research about the level of politicization across West 
European democracies (Kopecký, Mair, and Spirova 
2012; Müller 2006).4 Also, it is likely that individuals 
who keep a low profile with respect to their party affili-
ation (and therefore cannot be identified as party affili-
ates) are less closely associated with the party than, for 
instance, appointees with a life-long career in elected 
public office.
Figure 1 presents the share of appointees with party 
ties to the government by country. There is large vari-
ation in the extent to which appointments are politi-
cized. Among the 16 countries, some of the “usual 
suspects” when it comes to politicization score high, 
for example Austria, Italy, or Belgium. Yet, countries 
such as France and Germany also display high levels of 
party affiliation (which is in accordance with research 
on elite bureaucrats there, see Derlien 2003; Mayntz 
and Derlien 1989; Rouban 2004; Sawicki and Mathiot 
1999). The Nordic countries are toward the bottom of 
the list, with low-to-moderate politicization levels in 
Sweden and Norway, and complete absence of partisan 
appointments in Denmark and Finland. The same goes 
for the United Kingdom and Ireland, where politiciza-
tion has arguably decreased in the recent past (Flinders 
2009; O’Malley, Quinlan, and Mair 2012)—especially 
for executive positions in government agencies (as 
opposed to board memberships).
Note, however, that there is also large variation in the 
number of appointees. This is mostly due to differences 
in the organizational structure and overall size of the 
agencies, as well as variation in executive turnover. 
RAs in smaller countries such as Austria, Finland, or 
Luxembourg have very lean organizations, with only 
one or two people at the top. In addition, the aver-
age tenure for top-level appointees in these countries is 
higher than in most other countries (Ennser-Jedenastik 
2015). Other countries, such as France, Switzerland, 
or Spain, prefer different types of organization (such 
as “commissions” or “committees” comprising a larger 
number of members at the top of the agency) and com-
bine these with shorter overall tenures (due, in some 
cases, to age or term limits).
The implication of the numbers shown in figure 1 for 
the empirical analysis is to control for cross-national 
variation, since national political cultures appear to 
vary dramatically in tolerating party politicization of 
the civil service.
The central explanatory variable is Gilardi’s index of 
formal agency independence. Since the analysis focuses 
on appointments of top-level personnel, a simple aver-
age of the two component indices A and B which cap-
ture features of the appointment and dismissal process 
of agency managers will be used (Gilardi 2008, 144–
6).5 All constituent items of the indices A and B refer 
to “de jure” characteristics as laid down in laws and 
agency statutes (see Supplementary Appendix).
4 The correlation of the percentages shown in figure  1 with Kopecký, 
Mair, and Spirova (2012) patronage index is 0.71; the rank correlation 
coefficient (Spearman’s rho) with the classification provided by Müller 
(2006) is 0.62.
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Figure 1. Party affiliation by country.
Note. Bars denote share of appointees with affiliation to a government party at the time of the appointment.
5 The two dimensions A  (referring to agency CEOs) and B (referring 
to board members) have a theoretical range from 0 to 1 and include 
information on term length, renewability, and rules for dismissal, as 
well as compatibility requirements and the appointing institution (see 
Supplementary Appendix). Since these two dimensions correlate highly 
(r  =  0.84), a simple average of A  and B is taken as the independence 
measure for the analysis. However, the Supplementary Appendix also 
reports models estimated with an alternative independence measure 
based on a principal components analysis of Gilardi’s five dimensions (A 
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There are, of course, alternative explanations for 
politicization in RAs. The statistical models try to cap-
ture some of the most important ones by specifying a 
number of control variables.
Agency resources. The urge to exert some form of 
political control may be greater for larger agencies 
than for smaller ones. Therefore, the number of agency 
staff at the time of the appointment will be included in 
the analysis.6 The expectation is, of course, that agen-
cies with more resources are more likely to see party-
affiliated personnel appointments at the top.
Agency age. Politicization may also vary system-
atically with agency age. Long-established institu-
tions have usually acquired a reputation over time. 
Politicians thus face lower uncertainty about their 
inner workings and likely policy output. By contrast, 
agencies that have only recently been established may 
be given closer scrutiny and therefore see higher lev-
els of politicization. Alternatively, it may be that, over 
the years, agencies drift from the public’s view and are 
therefore scrutinized less carefully. This may decrease 
the costs of politicization.
Appointment type. An indicator differentiating 
between the position of the agency chief executive 
officer (CEO) and other positions will be included in 
the models. The expectation here is that appointments 
at the very top are more likely to be politicized than 
those in the second tier.
Political constraints. Following Hanretty and Koop 
(2012b), the analysis also includes Henisz’ (2002) 
updated measure of political constraints (which 
is very similar to the concept of veto players). The 
expectation here is that it is more difficult to politicize 
public sector institutions on a larger scale in politi-
cal systems with many veto points. This is because 
appointments may require the consent of veto players, 
who—if from a different party than the appointer—
may not be willing to let their political competitors 
have their way.
Rule of law. An indicator for the rule of law taken 
from Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2009) is 
included. The assumption here is that countries with 
a stronger rule of law exhibit lower overall levels of 
politicization.
Year of appointment. A series of year dummies con-
trols for the possibility of time trends in the appoint-
ment of government affiliates.
Moreover, controlling for country-level heteroge-
neity addresses a potential endogeneity problem in 
the analysis. Since countries with a culture of strong 
politicization in the public sector are in greater need 
of signaling credible commitment, legal independence 
could be higher there because of politicization, rather 
than the other way round. This concern is mitigated by 
showing that the probability of partisan appointments 
also correlates with within-country variation in formal 
independence.7
Domain-level controls are used because independ-
ence levels vary systematically between utility, other 
economic and social regulators (Gilardi 2008). Table 1 
presents the summary statistics for all independent 
variables.8
Analysis
Before turning to the multivariate analysis, a bivariate 
breakdown of the relationship between politicization 
and agency independence is presented in figure 2.
Whereas only 14% of the appointees in the quin-
tile with the lowest levels of agency independence (Q1, 
with values of 26 or lower) are government allies, this 
number rises to around 20% in the three middle quin-
tiles, and then jumps to 35% in the top quintile (Q5, 
with an independence index of 64 or higher). Figure 2 
thus strongly suggests that there is a positive relation-
ship between formal independence and the appoint-
ment of government-affiliated individuals to top-level 
positions in RAs.
While the bivariate breakdown shown above is very 
much compatible with the view that politicians’ use of 
the appointment channel to influence regulatory policy 
increases with legal independence, it is not clear that 
this relationship holds once other factors are controlled 
for. To that end, a multivariate analysis is required.
The dependent variable in this analysis is a simple 
dichotomous measure of whether an appointee is affil-
iated with a government party or not. The reference 
group comprises mostly nonpartisan appointees, yet a 
small fraction also has ties to the opposition (47 out of 
537, or 8.8%). To assess the robustness of the results 
shown below, the Supplementary Appendix reports the 
same set of statistical models with the group of oppo-
sition-affiliated appointees removed. The substantive 
6 Another possibility is to use agency budgets as predictors. Yet there 
is an extremely close correlation between staff and budget numbers 
(r = 0.88), since personnel costs are by far the largest budget item in 
most RAs. To make use of these data, missing staff numbers have been 
imputed for cases where budget figures were available. Imputation 
was done using linear regression with staff (logged) as dependent 
variable, agency budgets (logged) and country and domain dummies 
as predictors (adjusted R2: 0.883).
7 To be sure, this argument requires one to accept that the degree of party 
penetration in the public sector is largely a country-level phenomenon, 
with little within-system variation. Using the data provided by Kopecký 
and Mair (Kopecký and Mair 2012, 371) for nine policy sectors nested 
within fifteen countries to run a variance component model suggests 
that more than 60% of the variation in party patronage is, indeed, 
between rather than within countries. This suggests that controlling for 
country-level effects can mitigate the endogeneity problem.
8 The models below report random effects at the group level. Fixed 







niversiteit Leiden / LU
M
C
 user on 24 Septem
ber 2019
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 2016, Vol. 26, No. 3514
conclusions for the relationship between legal inde-
pendence and the appointment of government affiliates 
remain the same.
Table  2 presents two hierarchical mixed-effects 
models with appointees nested in agencies and agencies 
nested in countries (model I) or regulatory domains 
(model II).
The coefficients for agency independence are posi-
tive and significant in both iterations, suggesting that 
even after controlling for agency resources, agency age, 
CEO appointments, political constraints, the rule of 
law, time trends as well as unobserved variation at the 
level of countries, domains, and agencies, there is still 
a positive correlation between legal independence and 
the appointment of co-partisans.
Taking the exponential of the raw coefficients yields 
odds ratios of around 1.03. With every one-point 
increase in the formal agency independence index the 
odds of a government partisan being appointed thus rise 
by about 3%. While this may sound like a small effect, 
recall that the empirical range of the independence 
index is from 0 to 87. The effects reported in table 2 
are thus not only statistically significant, but also sub-
stantively important.
In order to illustrate how the appointment patterns 
change with legal independence, figure 3 plots the pre-
dicted probabilities calculated from models I  and II, 
with all other covariates held constant at their means 
(continuous variables) or modes (categorical vari-
ables). Across the empirical range of the independence 
index (from 0 to 87), the probability of a government 
ally being appointed raises from 3% to 26% according 
to model I and from 3% to 28% according to model II.
Again, these results show substantial differences in 
party politicization emerging between non-independ-
ent and highly independent agencies. We can therefore 
conclude that the analysis is very much in line with the 
assumption that higher levels of de jure independence 
create incentives for party politicization, thus poten-
tially lowering de facto independence. The appoint-
ment of government-affiliates to senior positions 
is thus a much more common occurrence in highly 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of the Independent Variables
Variable N Mean SD Min Max
Formal agency independence 684 44.208 21.421 0 87
Agency staff (log) 684 5.255 1.256 1.863 9.393
Agency age (log) 684 2.345 1.057 0 4.511
Agency CEO 684 0.365 0.482 0 1
Political constraints 684 0.466 0.124 0.120 0.720
Rule of law (exponentiated) 684 4.774 1.634 1.405 7.691
Note: About 100 observations were dropped due to missing information on staff and agency independence. The original agency independ-
ence index has been multiplied by 100 to enable better interpretation of regression coefficients. Logarithmic and exponential transformation 
have been applied to staff numbers, agency age, and the rule of law index in order to reduce the skewness of these predictors.
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5























N=160 N=136 N=148 N=160 N=147
Figure 2. Affiliation with government party by formal agency independence (quintiles).
Note. Bars denote share of appointees with affiliation to a government party at the time of the appointment; formal independence 
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independent agencies than in those with low levels of 
formal autonomy.
A look at the control variables in the regression 
models indicates that most of these predictors do not 
have much of an impact. One important exception is 
the finding that politicization is much more likely for 
CEO appointments than for other types of top-level 
positions. The coefficients from models I and II trans-
late into odds ratios between 2.7 and 3. The odds of a 
government partisan being nominated thus increase by 
a factor of (almost) three when the position in question 
is the one at the very top of the agency.
This result is hardly surprising, and it chimes with 
the underlying premise of the findings above. In both 
cases, politicians seek to exert influence over regula-
tory policy by politicizing appointments to agencies. 
The incentive to politicize is a function of how much 
control any individual appointee can be expected 
to have. The expected level of control is certainly 
greater in highly independent agencies, but also for 
agency CEOs.
Agency resources (operationalized with staff num-
bers) do not seem to matter a great deal. Both coef-
ficients are positive and thus suggest that politicization 
increases with agency resources, yet none of them 
comes with a p value smaller than .1. Nor does agency 
age seem to play any role in explaining politicization. 
The assumption that younger agencies are more likely 
to see politicized appointments is thus not borne out 
by the data.
The rule of law coefficient is significant only in model 
II. In model I, the country-level effects absorb the impact 
of this predictor (which, unsurprisingly, varies mostly 
between countries rather than over time). The veto 
player structure does not appear to have an impact.
Finally, the random components of the two models 
suggest that there is substantial unobserved variation 
at the agency- and the country-level, yet little at the 
level of the seven regulatory domains.
Discussion and Concluding Remarks
The analysis above shows that politicization—opera-
tionalized as the appointment of co-partisans to senior 




 Formal agency independence 0.0310** 0.0290***
(0.00982) (0.00567)
 Agency staff (log) 0.201 0.119
(0.166) (0.0770)
 Agency age (log) 0.0709 −0.0459
(0.114) (0.110)
 Agency CEO 1.101*** 1.016***
(0.269) (0.207)
 Rule of law (exponentiated) −0.217 −0.198**
(0.229) (0.0766)
 Political constraints −0.241 0.777
(1.810) (1.302)
 Year dummies Yes Yes
 Constant −4.393* −3.979**
(2.094) (1.296)
Random part




 Variance component (agency) 0.508* 1.472***
(0.230) (0.242)
 N (individuals) 684 684
 N (agencies) 92 92
 N (countries/domains) 16 7
Log likelihood −307.9 −328.5
Note. Entries are raw coefficients from hierarchical mixed-effects 
logistic regression models with appointees nested within agencies 
and agencies nested within countries (model I) or domains (model 
II); SE (in parentheses) clustered on agencies.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.




































Figure 3. Predicted probabilities of appointing government-affiliated individual to agency.
Note. Predicted probabilities with 95% confidence intervals, assuming random effect is zero; calculations based on models I (left panel) 
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positions in RAs—is positively correlated with legal 
agency independence, even after controlling for a 
series of other predictors as well as variation across 
agencies, countries, and policy domains. The findings 
are consistent with the proposition that politicians 
respond to high levels of formal agency independence 
with greater efforts at appointing political allies to the 
agency leadership.
While reasonable people can surely disagree about 
the relative merits of responsiveness through party 
control versus credibility through formal independence 
(Mair 2009; Scharpf 1999), the empirical analysis pre-
sented above clearly has implications for the normative 
debate on the role of non-majoritarian institutions in 
democratic governance.
On the one hand, it suggests that—partly contra-
dicting Thatcher’s (2005) observation—party politici-
zation is a salient phenomenon in regulatory politics 
and that the institutional mechanism to establish cred-
ibility creates an incentive structure that can motivate 
politicians to undermine the norm of non-interference. 
This constitutes an important qualification of the 
effectiveness of legal independence as a commitment 
device. It also shows that, while some measures of de 
facto independence are positively correlated with legal 
independence (Hanretty and Koop 2012b), others are 
inversely related to it.
On the other hand, the results also give some reason 
for optimism to those scholars of party government 
who are worried about the extent to which partisan 
governments can still produce policy outcomes in line 
with their democratic mandates (Mair 2008). While the 
dispersion of authority in the public sector has made it 
more difficult for government politicians to implement 
their agenda, political parties can partly compensate 
for this by coordinating and controlling policy through 
more dispersed networks that include appointees loyal 
to a specific political cause. Appointments of co-par-
tisans can thus be understood as an organizational 
resource that amplifies the governing capacities of a 
party (Flinders and Matthews 2010; Kopecký, Mair, 
and Spirova 2012; see, however, Lewis 2007).
As the statistical analysis implies, legal agency 
independence makes the appointment of government-
affiliated individuals more likely. To be sure, any such 
interpretation must happen with great caution, since 
the analysis of observational data can hardly ever 
establish causal relationships. Yet, what it can abso-
lutely contribute is to point out which assumptions are 
not consistent with the data—a crucial task, given that 
this is the first large-N study to look at the relation-
ship between formal agency independence and party 
politicization.
Hence, the idea that legal independence pro-
tects agencies from party politicization—whether by 
creating institutional barriers or by strengthening the 
norm of non-interference—is clearly challenged by the 
results presented above. The descriptive evidence and 
the multivariate analysis plainly show that co-parti-
sanship with the government is more prevalent among 
appointees to highly independent agencies.
As a final note, the results also speak to the debate 
about the relationship between the governing capac-
ity of democratic governments and the fragmentation 
of the public sector. The use of party patronage and 
party politicization thus need not necessarily be an 
evil, but can also be understood as an adaptation of 
political parties to organizational transformations in 
the public sector. A more dispersed state apparatus 
requires a more network-like party organizational 
approach (Kopecký, Mair, and Spirova 2012). While 
the present analysis strongly suggests that parties 
act to some degree strategically in response to the 
increased levels of formal independence of RAs, it 
will be up to future research to investigate whether 
such strategies do, indeed, have an impact on regula-
tory policy outcomes.
Supplementary Material
Supplementary material is available at the Journal of 
Public Administration Research and Theory online 
(www.jpart.oxfordjournals.org).
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